General Douglas Mac Arthur
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished
Members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep
humility and great
pride -- humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who
have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative
debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations
and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any
partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm
of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of
national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I
trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have
to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with neither rancor nor
bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to
serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the
problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but
to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the
Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and
the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.
There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts,
that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of
defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength
on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a
global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of
every other sector. You can not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in
Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in
Europe.
Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I
shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may
objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend
something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her
course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with
little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity,
or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the
Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to
throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity,
a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.
Mustering
half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these
peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with
which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern
progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the
concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and
it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic
frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area
whence it started.
In this situation, it becomes vital that our
own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary
condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is
now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny.
What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support -- not
imperious direction -- the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation.
Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the
devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian
thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the
opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing
on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of
the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social
conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do
form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered
if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.
Of more direct and immediate bearing upon
our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the
Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic
frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas, with an
exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the
Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of
weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.
The Pacific was a potential area of advance
for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All
this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to
embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long
as we held
it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free
lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain
of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us
and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air
power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore -- with sea and air power
every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to Singapore -- and prevent any hostile
movement into the Pacific.
*Any predatory attack from Asia must be an
amphibious effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without control of the
sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and
air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from
continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to
failure.
Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer
represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes,
instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a
natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.
It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions
essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an
invincible defense against aggression. The
holding of this littoral defense line in the western
Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major
breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined
attack every other major segment.
This is a military estimate as to which I
have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I
have strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that
under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an
eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss
of Japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of
California, Oregon and Washington.
To understand the changes which now appear
upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character
and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely
non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The
war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of
the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the
regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of
a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the
leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition
under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of
a united nationalism of increasingly dominant, aggressive tendencies.
Through these past 50 years the Chinese
people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They
now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders. This
has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is
allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become
aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power
normal to this type of imperialism.
There is little of the ideological concept
either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so
low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that
the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems to
promise the alleviation of local stringencies.
I have from the beginning believed that the
Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their
interests are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe that
the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China
and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the
same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror
since the beginning of time.
The Japanese people, since the war, have
undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a
commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they
have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to
the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing
process there has been created a truly representative government committed
to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social
justice.
Politically, economically, and socially Japan
is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the
universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial
influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent
manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war,
unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within
their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress.
I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without
the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan.
The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future
constructive service in the advance of the human race.
Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can
look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a
strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible
destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them -- as in
our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as
a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity
for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.
On Formosa, the government of the
Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the
malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the
Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened
administration with majority representation on the organs of government, and
politically, economically, and socially they appear to be advancing along sound
and constructive lines.
With this brief insight into the surrounding
areas,
I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the
President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that
decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we -- as I said,
proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives
within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.
This created a new war and an entirely new
situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against
the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the
diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military
strategy.
Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right
mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such
was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic
revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy
as we had defeated the old.
Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to
neutralize the
sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military
necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification of our
economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade
against the China coast; three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's
coastal areas
and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of
China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations
against the common enemy.
For entertaining these views, all
professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities
to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles,
principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the
above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military
leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
I called for reinforcements but was informed
that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to
destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize
the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to
blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from
without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of
the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.
We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver
and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with
the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only
an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces
if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for
the new political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts have been made to distort my
position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be
further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and
nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its
complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has
rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on
the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the
surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally
cautioned as follows:
Men since the beginning of time have
sought peace. Various methods through the
ages have been attempted to devise an
international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very
start workable methods were found in so
far as individual citizens were concerned,
but the mechanics of an instrumentality of
larger international scope have never
been successful. Military alliances,
balances of power, Leagues of Nations,
all in turn failed, leaving the only path to
be by way of the crucible of war. The
utter destructiveness of war now blocks
out this alternative. We have had our last
chance. If we will not devise some
greater and more equitable system,
Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and
involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will
synchronize with our almost matchless
advances in science, art, literature, and all
material and cultural developments of
the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit
if we are to save the flesh.